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 The shadow in the balance sheet: The spectre of Enron and how 
accountants use the past as a psychological defence against the future 
 
Abstract 
 
Accounting frameworks play a crucial role in enabling us to make sense of business. 
These frameworks provide a common language for individuals, organizations and 
broader economic groupings to understand and make decisions about the commercial 
realm in which they operate. From a psychodynamic perspective, the language of 
accounting also plays an important role. On the one hand it offers a way to tame the 
uncertainty and unknowability of the future by representing it in the same comforting 
terms as it does the past, thus reducing anxiety. Accounting provides a ‘shorthand’, which 
achieves a balance between positive and negative, debit and credit, asset and liability. On 
the other hand, accounting can also provide an arena in which fantasies about the future 
can be staged. However, the use of accounting language is problematic, particularly when 
it comes to dealing with the future. First, accounting frameworks are inherently backward 
looking and second, the reassuring sense of clarity and predictability they give are bought 
at the price of unrealistic simplification. The shadow is never far away and is a constant 
source of surprises in the unfolding future of a business. Rationalizing and sanitizing the 
shadow through accounting language may alleviate anxiety but fails to provide an escape 
from its effects, and echoes from the shadow side of business are capable of shaking the 
world in the form of accounting scandals. Governments and businesses have reacted to 
scandals such as Enron and Worldcom by tightening legislation and refining accounting 
standards but little, if anything, has been done to bring us any closer to confronting the 
shadow of business where these scandals have their roots. 
 
This paper explores the ways in which accounting frameworks provide a source of 
psychological defence against the future. In particular, it will look at how accounting for 
‘intangibles’ serves to symbolically contain both the fearful and the fantastic side of the 
future thus meeting the psychological needs of a number of key stakeholder groups. As 
such, intangibles form a representation of the shadow of the future, albeit an ambiguous 
one. The ideas developed in the paper are explored by considering the case of Enron. 
 
The paper shows how the gap between a psychoanalytic and an accounting view of 
business might be bridged. The themes of the paper provide a vehicle for demonstrating 
how psychoanalytic principles can contribute to the understanding of business, in 
particular those risks which, if unmanaged, can lead to the obliteration of huge 
corporations. 
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The shadow in the balance sheet:  the spectre of Enron and how 
accountants use the past as a psychological defence against the future 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Achieving a coherent reconciliation between the past, present and future is arguably one 
of the most critical challenges facing an organization’s leadership. Stakeholders in the 
business, members of the organization, analysts and other interested observers look to the 
Chief Executive and board members to account for the past, make decisions about the 
future and pilot the business on its journey between the two. Accounting systems play a 
fundamental role in planning, charting and documenting this journey. The language of 
accounting reduces past and future business events to equivalent terms, linking them 
seamlessly and giving a sense of continuity. It is seen to provide a means of ‘regularising 
organizational functioning across time and space’ (Baxter and Chua, 2003, p.101). 
Beyond that, it offers the enticing possibility of playing with time. Alternative accounting 
treatments can provide alternative accounts of the past. They can also be used to generate 
an infinite range of future scenarios. In fact, it is not possible to describe the past in 
accounting terms without anticipating and imagining the future (McSweeny, 2000). 
Perhaps most appealing is the way accounting can be used to freeze the present and 
enrich it with desired future outcomes through the creation of intangible assets. Intangible 
assets have no physical substance and cannot easily be converted into cash in the present 
but are deemed to be capable of producing value in the future. The aim of this paper is to 
explore some of the psychoanalytic aspects of accounting representations, with particular 
focus on ‘intangibles’ and their potential for sanitising or fantasising the shadow of the 
future. Intangibles include factors such as the value of a brand (the name Heinz is 
apparently worth more than the factories the company owns), Intellectual Property (for 
example a drugs firm might have a number of unrealised patents and inventions) and 
goodwill (for instance a corner shop might have a large number of satisfied customers).  
The following discussion will argue that intangibles serve a powerful organisational 
purpose, which goes well beyond their ‘official’ accounting function. Viewed from a 
systems psychodynamic perspective, they can, on  the one hand, present the future in 
safe, rational terms as a means of defence against anxiety. On the other hand they provide 
a screen in the balance sheet onto which future fantasies can be projected and played out. 
All of this is achieved in a way which connotes rationality and competence on the part of 
management. 
 
The paper begins by considering some of the problems businesses face when making 
sense of, and accounting for the future. As the commercial landscape becomes 
increasingly complex, the future becomes less predictable and accounting for business 
performance in terms of ‘tangible’ accounting measures is more difficult. Against this 
backdrop, intangibles have emerged as means of accounting for the value latent within a 
business to reflect the future success it will bring. The discussion then moves to the 
unconscious currents which run through businesses. Here, it is suggested that the shadow 
of the future has two faces. On the one hand, the future is something to be feared. 
Growing complexity makes it harder and harder for management to make sense of the 
commercial environment in which they operate. Whilst presenting themselves as rational 
experts, able to discern relationships and make decisions which will boost shareholder 
value in the future, on an unconscious level they are constantly seeking defence against 
the anxiety provoked by the chaos and complexity which the future holds. On the other 
hand, the future is a realm of fantasy, where anything is possible and an idealized form of 
the organization can be created. Accounting frameworks offer the means of dealing with 
both of these faces of the future, as their shadow is cast in the present. The use of 
accounting means that past, present and future business events can be presented in an 
orderly, systematic fashion. Here, the balance sheet provides a safe refuge against 
complexity and uncertainty and serves to reinforce a sense of predictability and 
controllability. Accounting for the intangible is particularly appealing as it offers to 
bridge the gap between the certainty of the present and the chaos of the future. 
Intangibles are also key when it comes to dealing with the fantastic future. Here, they 
provide a means of accounting for, and thereby rationalizing, hubristic and narcissistic 
decisions. It is argued then that accounting representations serve to contain both fears and 
hopes about the future and, as such become a shadow of the future to come. 
 
In this paper we explore the role of accounting practices from a systems psychodynamic 
perspective: that is to say, we focus attention on the role of unconscious processes in the 
organisation, particularly those that collectively drive people (Neumann and Hirschhorn, 
1999). We are particularly interested in emotion in organisations—not intelligence or 
individual awareness of emotion, but the role of emotions in the broader system- their 
meaning; what they have to say about the organisation as a system in context (Armstrong, 
2000). In order to explore these dynamics in relation to accounting practices, we have 
chosen Enron as a case to explore the application of these ideas. It is well known with 
much material in the public domain, but has largely been explored in terms of the 
personalities of key players (e.g. Lay, Skilling, Fastow) and the ethics and legality of 
decisions. In using Enron in this paper we are not seeking to provide an alternative/ better 
explanation—it may well be that these individuals had personal motivations or 
personalities that were significant in determining Enron’s decisions. We do suggest 
however, that some aspects of Enron’s downfall can be explored from the perspective of 
collective and unconscious emotion and emotionality, specifically that accounting 
practice can provide an importance social defence and influence how executives take up 
their roles in the organisation. There are many interesting aspects of Enron that are not 
explored in this paper; we are limiting our analysis to those that we think central to the 
concepts in this paper. 
 
These ideas about the future and the shadow it casts in a company’s balance sheet are 
illustrated through reference to the events leading up to the collapse of Enron. There are 
several aspects of the Enron case, which make it interesting within the context of the 
current discussion. Of particular relevance is that fact that Enron was overtly pursuing 
what was referred to as an ‘asset light’ policy, where increasing emphasis was placed on 
the importance of intangible assets. Another key aspect is the central role played by 
accountants, both inside and outside the organization. Accountants in Enron’s Global 
Finance Department and its auditors, Arthur Andersen helped to create and legitimise the 
complex financial structures which made Enron look so successful. Furthermore, it was 
towards the accountants that much of the blame was directed in the aftermath of the 
scandal. The fact that Enron is perhaps ‘the most intensively dissected company in the 
history of American business’ (McLean and Elkind, 2003, p. vii) means that there is a 
large body of data relating to the case against which the ideas set out in this paper can be 
tested. 
 
It will be argued that, for Enron and its senior management, the fearful and the fantastic 
faces of the future both provoked extreme responses. The ferociously competitive 
environment in which Enron operated, the overwhelming complexity of the markets it 
was attempting to develop and the lightening speed with which analysts reacted to its 
performance compounded feelings of uncertainty and anxiety about the future. The 
abundance of high intellect employees, the seemingly limitless possibilities for 
establishing new markets, all under the management of narcissistic leaders combined to 
exaggerate the possibilities of a fantastic future, which for a long time, employees and 
investors were more than happy to believe. The story of Enron’s growth and success was 
predicated on mastery of the future and Enron relied on its accountants to frame that 
future in accounting terms. Looking at the financial statements produced by Enron’s 
accountants, the shadow of its future to come is clearly discernable. Though due to the 
ambiguity of the language of accountancy, coupled with both individual and group 
mechanisms, strangely (or perhaps not) it seems that it was not discernable at the time. If 
‘ Words and articulate speech are wonderful inventions [yet] still in their infancy’ (Bion; 
1979, p128) then the language of accountancy is a far more recent invention, and thus 
even less developed.  The fantastic future, with its promise of greater success to come, is 
encapsulated by the large proportion of total value which existed in the form of intangible 
assets. This reached a peak in August 2000, approximately half of Enron’s $70 billion 
market valuation, related to parts of its business for which great things were promised for 
the future but which had not yet generated any earnings at all. Within the context of the 
current discussion, it could be argued that by August 23rd, 2000, when Enron’s share 
price reached its all time high of $90, the market was valuing the shadow of its future at 
$35 billion. However, the fact that so much of Enron’s value had no physical foundation, 
and was built more on hubris and hope than tangible assets, meant that its value was able 
to evaporate almost instantly. For Enron, this was the future which came to be. Hence, 
the shadow of the fearful future (which, for Enron’s employees and investors, has now 
become part of its tragic past) is also discernable in its balance sheet. 
 
The references to the Enron case made below are not intended to imply that a 
psychodynamic interpretation of intangibles provides a definitive explanation of 
corporate catastrophe. The aim is merely to illustrate how purportedly rational and 
objective accounting representations lend themselves to more cryptic interpretations. 
Thus accounting representations can actually be seen not only to represent economic 
events and relationships but also as representing the shadow of the future.  
 
 
Making sense of the future 
 
Making sense of and attempting to manage the future is a primary challenge for any 
business. The process of defining strategy, making decisions and pursuing a vision for the 
business is predicated on a meaningful appreciation of the future. To understand and 
manage risk it is necessary to view what is known in the present in terms of its future 
implications. Indeed, it could be argued that the ontological basis for successful business 
planning and management is rooted in a view of the business which unites past present 
and future. 
 
The task of reflecting the past, present and future of business falls to accountants, through 
the operation of financial reporting systems. Accounting systems present the past, present 
and future in a consistent way, united as part of a narrative whole (Carr, 1986). Financial 
statements and management accounts show what has gone before and business plans and 
budgets indicate what is to come and both time periods are expressed in equivalent terms. 
Any given moment, past, present or future can be frozen and expressed in terms of assets 
and liabilities in a balance sheet. McSweeney (2000) suggests that financial reporting 
straddles time by presenting a view of what Augustine (discussed in Ricouer, 1984) 
described as the ‘triple present’ (the present of the past, the present of the present, the 
present of the future). Perhaps it is this mastery of time which helps contribute to what 
Mattesich (1968) described as ‘the authoritative character’ of accounting (p. 414). In any 
event, the claims of objectivity and impartiality which are made for accounting make it 
an ideal framework upon which to build a ‘rational’ view of the world. Arguments and 
explanations framed in accounting terms imply rationality and serve to underpin the idea 
that the world is predictable and manageable. It is not surprising then, that accounting is 
seen as the language of business and that accountants have risen to senior positions 
within many organizations (Armstrong, 1985, 1987). 
 
The portrayal of business reality as financial reality, through the use of accounting, is 
therefore an attractive option, as it enables the future to be presented with a similar 
degree of order and certainty as the past. Moreover, the neat symbolism of accounting 
representations connotes rationality, expertise and understanding. Accounting language 
provides a means of managing complexity and demonstrating control serving to 
legitimise the power and rewards which business leaders enjoy. However, the dominance 
of accounting as a means of representing reality is conditional on its ability to adapt as 
that reality changes. The essence of risk management is managing the gap between the 
present and the future – the greater the gap the greater the risk. Although accounting is 
able symbolically to stand outside the spatio-temporal continuum, the fact remains that it 
is rooted in the past yet has to make sense of the future. At a time when economic growth 
is increasingly characterised by constant innovation, the rapid development and 
implementation of new technologies, the effective management and communication of 
information, and the establishment of more flexible and sophisticated organizational 
structures, the future is less and less like the past. Factors such as globalization, increased 
complexity and shifting economic and political structures are all powerful influences 
which are fundamentally changing the environments in which businesses operate 
(Johanson, Marytensson and Skoog, 2001). Against this backdrop of profound change, 
traditional accounting descriptions of ‘tangible’ assets are not nearly as significant as they 
were. Instead, the primary drivers of business growth are now seen as being ‘intangible’ 
(Lev and Zambon, 2003).  
 
 
Accounting and Intangibles 
 
As described above, the need to account for intangibles has grown as accountants have 
sought ways to reflect the capacity of business to generate value in the future. Faced with 
an increasingly complex reality and an ever changing future, pressure has mounted for 
accountants to make sense of the correspondingly complex process of value creation. As 
Fincham and Roslender (2003) say: 
 
“…attempts to devise new ways of making ‘hidden value’ visible have met with a 
growing awareness that the dynamics of value creation are not adequately represented” 
(p. 782). 
 
Intangible assets are assets which, in contrast to tangible or ‘hard’ assets such as 
buildings or equipment, have no physical substance. The value of intangible assets lies in 
their ability to generate value in the medium to long term future. The costs of certain 
intangible assets, such as licences, patents, franchises and trademarks can be clearly 
separately identified and the process by which they will generate value is relatively clear 
and predictable. Accounting principles permit companies to reflect the value of these 
intangibles assets in their balance sheet. Intangible assets also include ‘goodwill’ which  
relates to the idea that a business has a further value above and beyond the book value of 
all of its assets taken together. Goodwill is a general term which relates to the value of all 
the elements which give a business its competitive advantage and enable it to achieve 
greater profits than other similar firms. A key component of goodwill is intellectual 
capital. This refers to the intelligence and management ability of its people and the way 
in which these qualities can be harnessed to achieve competitive advantage. The goodwill 
of a company cannot be identified and valued separately from its other assets and 
companies are not permitted to include the value of their own goodwill within their 
financial statements. However, when one company acquires another and pays a premium 
over and above the fair market value of its assets, this is described as ‘purchased 
goodwill’ and they are permitted to then include this in their financial statements. 
 
The brief description above sets out the official, value-reflective, purpose of intangibles. 
Before considering the unconscious aspects of intangibles and their link to the future, it is 
worth highlighting two differences between intangible assets and other categories of 
asset. Firstly, whereas accounting measures usually take a pessimistic view of value, and 
emphasise the basic accounting principle of prudence, the accounting treatment of 
intangibles takes an implicitly optimistic view – particularly of an organization’s 
leadership team. As discussed above, a core element of intangible assets is the notion of 
intellectual capital, a category which aims to somehow reflect the future value arising 
from the intellectual capability latent within the organization. This is linked to the upbeat 
management philosophy encapsulated in the oft quoted phrase ‘people are our greatest 
asset’. However, evidence for the value generative capacity of ‘human assets’ is, at best, 
mixed. In fact, when accounting scandals and catastrophic company collapses are 
analysed their causes can often be traced to flawed actions and decisions on the part of 
senior management. In such cases people could accurately be described as the 
organization’s greatest liability, yet accounting provides no equivalent means of 
reflecting intellectual liabilities where the organization’s leadership is incompetent or 
self-serving. By failing to provide a means of reflecting the value destructive potential of 
leadership, it could be argued that accounting is giving an unrealistically rosy view. This 
gives rise to a further difference between the accounting treatment of intangibles and the 
treatment of other assets. For tangible assets, the amount shown in the balance sheet 
represents the total of many smaller amounts so tangible assets can be separated and 
broken down. Intangible assets however, cannot be broken down in the same way. 
Goodwill, for example, may represent billions of dollars of value but cannot be broken or 
further analysed. This difference between intangible assets, which cannot be broken 
down, and tangible assets, which can, brings to mind Douglas’s (1987) description (cited 
in Brown 1997, p.656) of the way institutions “create shadowed places in which nothing 
can be seen and no questions asked” and “other areas show finely discriminated detail” 
(p.69). 
 
Attaching large blocks of value to intangible assets means that if the future fails to unfold 
as envisaged and the organization does not unleash to value embedded within its 
intangible assets then, large amounts of value can be lost very suddenly. Moreover, 
tangible categories of assets usually have some recovery value, even if the company is 
liquidated, the value of intangible assets is much more contingent upon the 
materialisation of a particular future scenario. If the assumptions upon which this 
scenario is predicated prove inaccurate or if unforeseen events come to pass, then large 
blocks of value can evaporate in an instant with far reaching and destabilizing 
consequences. Some of the most significant adjustments to companies’ financial 
statements are linked to the revaluation of writing off of intangible assets.  
 
 
Intangibles and the unconscious 
 
The unpredictable, ambiguous and essentially chaotic nature of the future is an ever 
present source of anxiety.  Even during times of relative stability, the future is a 
threatening place, which we move towards at a pace beyond our control, where there are 
no certainties apart from the fearful prospect of death (Becker, 1973). However, 
Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons (2001) point out that our perspective on the future has 
shifted in recent decades from a long perspective (including our hopes for the afterlife) 
to a much shorter horizon. Actions, choices and decisions are positioned on a temporal 
axis that links the present to the future and the future is linked to the present by an 
imaginary time-space filled by a potential presumed to be open and responsive to human 
action, desires and fears. What has changes is that ‘the future has been dramatically 
foreshortened and is now experienced as an extended present…….the conviction that the 
future can be shaped, provided it is imagined and anticipated correctly…...has grown 
much more powerful’. This argument is a comment on society at large; it indicates an 
extensively held belief that the future can be choreographed. On the other hand anxiety 
about the future is compounded as the pace and scope of change increases and the 
emerging future is less and less like the past we know and increasingly difficult to 
predict. Economic, social and organizational changes make it difficult for executives to 
extrapolate from past experience into the future. The importance of ‘vision’ and 
‘strategic capability’ has increased currency as if executives can manage future 
uncertainties.The related increase in the importance of intangibles as a means of 
accounting for reality therefore take on an added significance when considered from a 
psychodynamic perspective.  
 
For business leaders, anxiety related to future uncertainty is especially pronounced as 
their ‘success’ is directly linked to their ability to anticipate and evaluate the future. As 
business performance is widely reported, any failure will be highly visible and painful, 
leaving the self more vulnerable. Failure to accurately gauge the future can lead to losses 
on a commercial and psychological level and, as Schott (1999) says: “loss is the most 
disorganising event to the sense of self” (p.66). For business leaders then, understanding 
and mastering the future becomes an important element in the wider challenge of 
preserving self-esteem (Brown, 1997, Erez and Earley, 1993). Here, intangibles can be 
seen as offering a convenient mechanism for denying the mystery of how they will 
create value in the future. By emphasising the value of intellectual capital, leaders can 
create a putative model of value generation through harnessing the intellectual capacity 
of their people without having to elaborate how this will be achieved. This also 
facilitates a process of attributional egotism. Intangible assets do not have to be broken 
down in the same detail as tangible assets and the casual chain through which they create 
value is not specified. This makes them ripe for the application of post hoc explanations 
for success, even if, in reality this is the result of events outside the control of the 
organization such as luck or errors on the part of competitors.  
 
However, as well as being threatening, the future may also emerge as being better than 
the past, and changes in the market and technology may enable success on a previously 
unimagined scale. From this perspective, the future is a realm where anything is possible 
and an idealized version of the business can be enacted. Here, intangibles can become 
significant instruments of self-aggrandizement, which can support the pursuit of 
narcissistic behaviour (Brown, 1997, Kets de Vries and Miller, 1985). The flexible, 
subjective nature of intangibles and the ease which they can be manipulated and 
multiplied also makes them ideal as a means of supporting fantasies of power and 
control (Gabriel, 1991, Lasch, 1978). Here, financial statements, despite their claim to be 
prudent, objective reflections of reality, become the script from which organizational 
fantasies are read. The case of goodwill is particularly relevant in connection with 
narcissistic behaviour in the context of mergers and acquisitions. As described above, 
goodwill is calculated as the difference between the price paid for a company and the 
value of its underlying assets. The computation of goodwill is a purely numerical 
exercise. It does not distinguish between overpayments which are the result of the 
sophisticated and accurate appreciation of future synergies and those which are the result 
of unrealistic, hubristic or overoptimistic decisions. Here, flawed decisions which could, 
and should, be challenged are given added legitimacy by expressing them in accounting 
terms.  
 
The possibility of accounting for intangibles can also be seen to serve certain 
unconscious needs of the accountants themselves. As described above, the principles of 
accounting for intangibles have been developed in response to the demands placed on 
accountants to represent business reality. Whilst business leaders’ sense of self is 
contingent upon their ability to understand and manage the future, for accountants, the 
preservation of self-esteem depends on their capacity to provide plausible representations 
of reality, even if that reality is changing. The rewards for this are considerable. As 
mentioned above, accountants are allowed to occupy many senior positions within 
organizations. Schwartz (1990) ascribes the superior status enjoyed by accountants to 
their capacity to feed narcissistic tendencies through the provision of corroborative 
financial analysis: 
 
“I suggest that the financial worldview can be understood as a kind of latter-day 
Pythagoreanism in which the world is seen as mere instantiation of number, and as 
imposing no bounds on the imagination’s flights. Everything seems possible as long as 
the numbers can be made to work, and the one who can make them work can take this as 
a sign of omnipotence” (p.65). 
 
For accountants, the development of more sophisticated techniques, such as intangibles, 
can be seen as a step to preserve their dominant, omnipotent status. To fail here would 
mean a loss of identity, legitimacy and self-esteem. As Fincham and Roslender (2003) 
point out:  
 
“The spectre of existing methods persistently failing managers in the modern corporation 
has long haunted accountancy” (p. 789). 
 
Accounting for intangibles can therefore be seen as the most recent round in a high stakes 
game in which business leaders and accountants are mutually dependent. If accountants 
succeed in providing frameworks which support the impression that business leaders are 
in control of the future they are rewarded with high status but if they fail they run the risk 
of losing their identity and of being dismissed as being irrelevant. As Lev and Zambon 
(2003) state: 
  
“…themes of relevance and irrelevance find more generalized expression in notions of 
success and failure and the attendant emotions of security and fear” (p. 790). 
 
The psychodynamic interdependency of business leaders and accountants in preserving 
one another’s status and identity can also be seen to feed the needs of a much wider 
stakeholder group – the investment community. For this group, business leaders and 
accountants assume heroic status, having gained mastery over the complexities of 
business and tamed the shadow of the future. As Mattesich (1968) suggested: 
 
“…the effectiveness of accounting lies not in the preciseness of information to 
management for maximizing profit or any other entrepreneurial goal, but in its 
authoritative character.” (p. 414). 
 
The foregoing discussion has shown how the official purpose met by the accounting 
treatment of intangibles is matched by a more subtle purpose; from a psychodynamic 
perspective we suggest that it serves to contain anxiety about the future. The intangibles 
on the balance sheet both ‘sanitize the future’ by providing an optimistic view of 
organisation assets and avoid the acknowledgement of organisational liabilities (such as 
the behaviours of key executives) and simultaneously ‘fantasize the future’ by providing 
a screen onto which any positive future scenario can be projected.  During a time of rapid 
social, economic and technological change intangibles serve as means of reflecting a 
more complex chain of value creation. The increasing proportion of total value accounted 
for by intangibles reflects the idea that the business’s capacity to create value in the 
future is increasingly attributable to its ability to draw on strengths and abilities which 
cannot be broken down into traditional, more ‘tangible’ assets. On an unconscious level, 
intangibles offer the means of symbolically containing the shadow of the future. They 
create a comforting link between the future and the past, making the complexity 
manageable, yet providing a canvass on which idealized future scenarios can be 
presented. Both aspects of intangibles are, however, problematic. 
 
It can be argued then, that accounting for the intangible aspects of business addresses 
needs arising from both the threatening and the fantastic aspects of the future. On the one 
hand, they represent a symbolic victory in the battle to manage, control and predict by 
collapsing the complexity and unpredictability of the future into the present. 
Alternatively, they can facilitate and sustain the generation of narcissistic fantasies. It 
could be argued therefore that, for organizations where the fearful aspect of the future 
(due to significant complexity, change and competition) and the fantastic aspect of the 
future (an organization faced with many new possibilities and a narcissistic leadership 
team) one might expect a greater emphasis on accounting representations of reality, and 
on intangibles in particular. These hypothesise are tested below using the Enron case 
study. 
 
The case of Enron 
 
The story of Enron took place against a backdrop of profound change for all businesses. 
During the 1990s, the unfolding future was less and less like the past.  Both the fearful 
and the fantastic faces of the future became a preoccupation for many business leaders. 
The world of business at this time has been described as being ‘hypercompetive’. Wall 
Street became preoccupied with the internet and the ‘new economy’. Analysts 
scrutinized companies’ performance as never before and market reactions became as fast 
as electric impulses (Fox, 2002). All businesses then, were confronted with an 
increasingly complex and competitive market place where the challenge of beating 
analysts’ expectations was harder than ever. Long (2002) has suggested that by the late 
20th century a ‘perverse’ culture had emerged through the mass operation of narcissism, 
greed and consumerism. Long suggests that the Enron case epitomises the wider culture 
of ‘perversion’ in which it was operating.  
The markets in which Enron was operating were perhaps more complex than most. 
Indeed, the trend for deregulation in energy markets meant that many of these markets 
had not previously existed and the future was very much up for grabs. 
 
For Enron then, the future was both complex and unpredictable. The pressure to succeed 
was compounded as every decision and business result was subject to scrutiny from Wall 
Street. Enron’s future was also exciting - brimming with possibilities for developing and 
exploiting new markets.  
 
In exploring the systems psychodynamics that might be operating during the rise and fall 
of Enron, their relationship to the future and the role played by accounting 
representations, it is useful to separate out the various stakeholder groups who affected 
and were affected by the case. The discussion below therefore considers actions and 
reactions of the following groups: Enron’s senior management, Enron’s accountants, 
Enron’s employees, and the stock market and its analysts and how the unconscious 
emotions in the organisation system might have influenced how they took up their roles. 
 
Enron’s senior management 
 
Of all the groups implicated in Enron’s collapse, it is probably the company’s 
management which has attracted the most attention and the most blame. The three key 
individuals were: Kenneth Lay, Enron’s former Chairman and Chief Executive, who 
created Enron out of Houston Natural Gas in the mid 1980s and remained its figurehead 
until it collapsed in 2002; Jeffrey Skilling, the ex McKinsey partner who masterminded 
Enron’s strategy and rose to the position of Chief Executive Officer between February 
and August 2001, when he left the firm; and Andrew Fastow, Enron’s Chief Financial 
Officer, who led the Global Finance Group and created the financial structures upon 
which its success (as reported) was based.  
 
In looking at Enron’s orientation to the future and the significance of intangibles, Jeffrey 
Skilling is perhaps the most significant of the three. Skilling joined Enron in 1990 as 
Chief Executive Officer of Enron Gas Services. In his previous role as a partner at 
McKinsey, Skilling had acted as the firm’s main strategy consultant. From the outset, 
Skilling emphasised the importance of Enron following what he referred to as an ‘asset-
light policy’. This was based on a belief that the real source of future value was 
intellectual capital as embodied by a company’s people and their ideas, rather than hard 
assets such as buildings and machines, which tied up cash and weighed down the balance 
sheet (Fusaro and Miller, 2002). At an oil and gas symposium, sponsored by Arthur 
Andersen in 1996, Skilling expounded his vision of future value creation: 
 
“… we don’t know what the products and services are going to look like five to 10 years 
from now, so you will have to have people creatively designing those. I think their 
competitive advantage won’t be based on assets any longer. It won’t be based on pipes 
and wires and generating facilities: it will be based on intellectual capital”. (Fox, 2003, 
p.75-76). 
 
Four years later, when Skilling had been able to implement his strategy and Enron’s 
value was at its peak, Enron’s management were still emphasising the significance of 
intellectual property. The following quote is taken from a letter sent to Enron’s 
shareholders, together with the 2000 annual report: 
 
“We are participating in a new economy and the rules have changed dramatically. What 
you own is not as important as what you know. Hard-wired businesses, such as energy 
and communications have turned into knowledge-based industries that place a premium 
on creativity. Enron has always been and always will be the consummate innovator 
because of our extraordinary people. It is our intellectual capital – not only our physical 
assets – that makes us Enron. Move our assets to another company, and the results would 
be markedly different” (quoted in Fusaro and Miller, 2002, p.69). 
 
Drawing on the account of Sherron Watkins, who was Enron’s head of corporate 
development, Swartz (2003) suggests that Skilling’s strategy was driven by two 
preoccupations:  
 
“..to discover the next thing that would dramatically enhance the company’s numbers 
and get rid of anything or anyone he believed was a drag on the balance sheet” (p.112). 
 
It is therefore clear, that for the architect of Enron’s strategy, Jeffrey Skilling, intangibles 
were seen to be significantly more important for Enron’s current and future success than 
traditional, ‘hard’ assets. However, as discussed above, companies are not permitted to 
simply book intellectual capital in their balance sheets. What they can do, however, is 
argue that having access to the intellectual capital of its people means that it is justified 
in paying a premium to acquire other companies. The argument here is that the assets of 
the acquired company are worth more when harnessed to the superior skills of the 
acquirer. As mentioned above, the overpayment is reflected in the acquirer’s balance 
sheet as ‘goodwill’. In understanding the amount one company is prepared to pay for 
another, it can therefore be argued that the greater the premium or overpayment, the 
higher the value the acquirer is placing on its own intellectual capital.  
 
As Enron grew, it continued to acquire other companies, often paying significant 
premiums above their market value. Amongst others, Fox (2003) mentions the following 
examples: 
 
- a 42% premium paid for Portland General, which was described as a ‘strategic 
acquisition’ 
- a 28% premium paid for the acquisition of Wessex Water 
- the amount it paid on acquiring water and sewerage concessions in Buenos 
Aires was $ 100 million more than even the company’s own analysts 
estimated 
- It paid $ 1.3 billion for Elekro in Brazil, when the Brazilian government’s 
asking price was $ 670 million 
 
These significant premiums suggest considerable confidence on the part of Enron in 
terms of its ability apply its intellectual capital to generate future value. Within the 
context of the current discussion, it is significant that between 1997 and 2000 intangibles 
accounted for an average of 30% of Enron’s total net assets. 
 
The fact that Enron was operating in a rapidly changing, unpredictable and therefore, 
high risk, environment does not appear to have prompted any fear of the future. Instead, 
Enron continued to make bolder and bolder claim about its future, promising its 
shareholders an annual growth in earnings per share of 15%. If achieved, this would  
define Enron clearly as a ‘growth company’ and ensure colossal financial rewards for its 
leaders (McClean and Elkind, 2003). From a psychodynamic perspective, it might be 
argued that, through its senior management, Enron denied the fearful face of the future by 
focussing all of its energy on the fantastic. The implication then, is that Enron’s 
predictions of future growth and success were driven more by fantasy than by the 
operation of sound strategic understanding and analysis. This idea is supported by the 
statements and actions of Enron’s management, which suggest are considerable level of 
narcissism. It is worth noting for example that, not only did the Jeffery Skilling have no 
previous experience of working in the energy sector, before joining Enron, he had never 
run any business before (McClean and Elkind, 2003). Even after six years with Enron,  
 
“..he still thought like a consultant, enamoured, always, of the Big Idea, with surprisingly 
little appreciation of how one got things done in the real world. He had zero interest in 
the nuts and bolts of operations.” (p.101). 
 
Far from being daunted by the risk which framed Enron’s operations, Skilling relished it - 
 
“We like risk because you make money taking risk.” (Fox, 2003, p.96) 
 
Skilling’s part of the business, which came to be named Enron Capital and Trade 
Resources (ECT) prided itself on its cutting edge trading techniques and its capacity to 
manage colossal trading risks. Fox (2003) suggests that the mood of ECT went on to 
influence the personality of the whole company:  
 
“As Skilling’s stock was rising within the company, Enron took on more of the 
entrepreneurial and extremely competitive personality that he hoped to fashion. 
Unfortunately, it could also be a greedy, self-involved, overconfident personality – and 
those characteristics sowed the seeds of hubris.” (p.97) 
 
It is interesting that, whilst Enron made increasingly bold promises about the future, its 
focus was increasingly on the here and now and there was little long-term strategic 
planning.  
 
“To some, Skilling’s emphasis on moving quickly seemed like he was all surface, not 
interested in digging deep to understand the fundamentals..” (Fox, 2003, p.104) 
 
Over time, there were fewer voices to challenge Enron’s pursuit of the fantastic future. A 
key event was the departure in 1996 of Richard Kinder, who had been the company’s 
president and CEO. Fusaro and Miller (2002) point out that he embodied an ‘old 
economy’ approach to trading, which involved always looking for the economic sense of 
a deal and challenging deals which did not make sense. When he left, there was little to 
hold the remaining senior management back: 
 
“Without Kinder, Lay and Skilling had no foil to ensure their visionary ambitions would 
remain grounded” (Fox, 2003, p.104). 
 
Enron was now free to invest money in new lines of business such as broadband. McLean 
and Elkind (2003) point out that to succeed in this venture Enron would have need two 
things – management expertise and patience – neither of which it possessed. 
 
We suggest that Skilling’s behaviour was supported by a system that colluded in the 
fantastic future painted by him; 
 
• The auditors (Arthur Anderson) did not point out any difficulties with the 
accounts presented to them and approved inflated earnings  
• Arthur Anderson were happy to take up a dual role of auditors and consultants to 
Enron  
• The Board of Directors failed to control the Executive (Lord Wakeham, a non- 
executive director, was an accountant but failed to scrutinize the books) 
• The audit commission failed to grasp what was happening 
• Regulators exempted Enron form certain key aspects normally requiring scrutiny 
• Wall St. allowed itself to be bullied into complicity 
• Politicians were happy to be paid off  
• Staff incentive (share options) /fear scheme (rank or yank) reinforced compliance 
 
 
 
Enron’s accountants 
 
The collusion had to include the accounting profession to ensure that the whole affair 
appeared rational and solid. Enron’s own accountants, led by their Chief Financial 
Officer Andrew Fastow, together with Arthur Andersen, its auditors, played a central 
role in its pursuit of a fantastic future. During the late 1990s, CFOs grew significantly in 
importance within American corporations and against this backdrop, Fastow became one 
of the most powerful, doubling the headcount in Enron’s Global Finance department, of 
which he was head. To gain a sense of the key roleFastow took in this system it is worth 
considering the description given by McClean and Elkind (2003): 
 
“Fastow became Enron’s Wizard of Oz, creating a giant illusion of steady and increasing 
prosperity. Fastow and his team were financial masterminds, helping Enron bridge the 
gap between the reality of its business and the picture Lay and Skilling wanted to present 
to the world.” (p.133).  
 
Fox (2003) makes a similar evaluation of Fastow: 
 
“Enron understood Fastow as the wizard who somehow juggled accounting rules so that 
the company could preserve its credit rating.” (p.156).  
 
Fastow’s mystical abilities are also alluded to by Swartz (2003): 
 
“Whatever Skilling wanted, Fastow seemed magically able to provide.” (p.167) 
 
Fastow had an appetite for complex financial structures and prided himself in is ability to 
achieve what the business wanted whilst still following the rules to the letter. 
 
Skilling also made extensive use of accountants in his Risk Assessment Control Group 
(RAC) who were charged with analysing the risks of deals undertaken by ECT. This 
group worked under tremendous pressure and, like the ‘wizard’ Fastow, were 
responsible for making the business’s wishes a reality. Swartz (2003) describes how they 
worked: 
 
“They were usually told on Friday that deal originators needed valuations for 
presentation to Jeffrey Skilling the following Monday. This required them to spend the 
next forty eight hours poring over spreadsheets and calculations trying to come up with 
any number that would allow a given deal to close.” (p.93) 
 
It is therefore clear that Enron’s own accountants were perceived to play a crucial role in 
making its fantastic vision of the future a reality and that Andrew Fastow’s role was to 
be as a mystic or wizard on behalf of Enron. 
 
However, Enron’s activities required external verification and it was here that Arthur 
Andersen, its statutory auditors, also came to play a key role. As external auditors it was 
the job of Arthur Andersen to sign off on Enron’s activities and vouch for the accuracy 
of its financial statements. Although Andersen was one of the world’s most respected 
professional accounting firms, Enron’s collapse would ultimately lead to its own 
collapse. A central problem was that, rather than break the accounting rules, Enron was 
aiming to exploit their complexity to do what it wanted whilst staying within them. This 
made it difficult for Andersen to take exception. Moreover, it is clear that over time 
Andersen allowed the lines of independence between it and its client became blurred. 
Not only did it earn more and more fees from Enron (reaching a peak of almost $100 
million in a single year) but many of the accountants working with Enron were, 
themselves, recruited from Arthur Andersen. 
 
The internal and external groups of auditors were rewarded handsomely both in 
monetary terms and in terms of the status and respect they were accorded, but it is clear 
that this was contingent on their capacity to continue to enable Enron’s plans. As 
mentioned above, whilst Arthur Andersen participated in the fruits of Enron’s success, it 
also ended up paying the highest possible price for its failure. A shadow of Andersen’s 
cataclysmic future was evident during Enron’s 2000 Christmas party. Following Arthur 
Andersen’s objections to Enron’s broadband deal involving video on demand (VOD), 
the firm was lampooned in a presentation entitled ‘The Grinch who stole VOD’ where 
Andersen was cast in the role of Grinch in “the story of how the mean heartless auditors 
tried to ruin the deal..”(McClean and Elkind, 2003). As Enron began to unravel, its 
senior management who had once feted the accountants, made conspicuous attempts to 
distance themselves. Fusaro and Miller (2002) point out that during his trial, Jeffrey 
Skilling’s ‘mantra’ was “I am not an accountant”. 
 
Enron’s employees 
 
Beyond Enron’s senior management and its accountants, the company’s employees 
represent another stakeholder group who had a substantial investment in Enron’s 
fantastic future and who colluded in its attainment. Indeed, the company’s growing 
preoccupation with the accounting version of reality was codified in the guidelines, 
which its employees used to guide their activities: 
 
“Reported earnings follow the rules and principles of accounting. The results do not 
always create measures consistent with underlying economics. However, corporate 
management’s performance is generally measured by accounting income and not 
underlying economics”. (Taken from the Enron Capital and Trade Resources Manual, 
1996-1997, cited in Fox, 2003). 
 
The employees’ growing pride in, and increasing dependence on, Enron’s success was 
enacted through mass participation in the Enron employee stock plan. From his earliest 
days with the firm, Skilling had viewed Enron’s share price as his ‘report card’ 
(McClean and Elkind, 2003) but as more and more employees tied up their life savings 
in Enron stock a kind of stock price mania erupted, with more an more people tracking 
its value (Fox, 2003). From a psychodynamic perspective, shares in Enron could 
themselves be seen as shares in the shadow of its future. This obsession with share price 
was not unusual among large corporations, where an increasing share price can often 
provoke a cycle of self-referential corporate narcissism, reflected in the Wall Street 
saying that if a company’s stock doubles, the ego of its management quadruples. The 
emotional as well as the financial investment which employees made in Enron is 
reflected by the pride and optimism which led them to hold on to their Enron shares, 
those fragments of its future shadow, even when its irreversible decline was obvious and 
senior management had started to liquidate their own shareholdings in large blocks. 
 
The collusion can perhaps be illustrated by an incident involving staff at the headquarters 
in Houston. Margaret Ceconi, a former Director of Enron Energy Services in a BBC 
Panarama programme describes how in 1998 a new dealing room was supposed to be 
operational. Financial analysts were due to visit and Enron was keen to impress them. 
Secretaries and other non-traders were roped in to pretend to do deals by phone and 
provide an illusion of an up and running trading floor. Later Ceconi asked people what 
they were thinking of and why they did it. The typical response was that people thought 
nothing of it –‘they asked me to do and so I did’.  
 
 
Market analysts and the stock market  
 
As discussed above, Enron’s management saw its share price as the ultimate measure of 
its success. Within the context of the current discussion, this is significant, as financial 
theory states that the share price which financial markets ascribe to a company reflects 
the present value of its future success and as such can be seen as the shadow of its future, 
broken down into tradable units. Enron’s share price represented not only a visible badge 
of its success, which could then fuel the narcissism of its management. It also 
represented the means by which its senior management could earn considerable wealth, 
way beyond their salaries. Fox (2003) points out that all Enron’s executives had 
enormous stock options and, for some, an increase in share price of only $1 could 
translate into a $5 million increase in wealth. Enron’s relationship with the analysts and 
Wall Street was therefore critical, and presenting the firm as favourably as possible 
(however unrealistic that was) was key: 
 
“…Skilling created impossible expectations and unbearable internal pressures by holding 
Enron out to Wall Street as something that it simply wasn’t. He created a wild, out-of-
control experiment yet presented it as a well-oiled machine that generated steadily 
growing profits. He offered the world a powerful, even charismatic, vision of the new 
Enron. But the Enron Skilling was describing …wasn’t even close to reality” (McClean 
and Elkind, 2003). 
 
During the period of Enron’s rise, the audience of analysts and the wider financial 
community were willing subscribers to the story of Enron’s success. Lay, Skilling and 
Fastow were lauded by the financial press and publications such as Fortune, Business 
Week and The Wall Street Journal were generous with their praise, lauding them as 
heroes of the new economy. Swartz (2003) points out that this was reflective of the 
mood of the time, when Wall Street was enamoured of the ‘new economy’ and indulged 
in a kind of collective denial of negative indications and the underlying risks. Fox (2003) 
talks about the way analysts became ‘cheerleaders’ for Enron as part of the wider market 
mood of “unsustainable optimism and self-justifying momentum” (p.195). 
 
But we can sometimes extrapolate effectively from what we know ‘It was probably the 
Future casting its shadow before; sometimes it is disguised as the Past casting its 
memory forward’ (Bion; 1979,p 38), there were tell tail signs but the need for collective 
collusion was such that no attention, somehow, was paid to thee glimmerings. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The current discussion allows only a superficial consideration of the Enron case. 
However, the various elements described above and the actions and interests of its 
different stakeholder groups do support the idea that Enron used the accounting version 
of reality, and the emphasis on intangibles which that enabled, to try and tame the 
shadow of the future. The examples above show the facility to create intangible assets 
can provide a vehicle for widespread rationalization. Inappropriate, self-serving decisions 
and hubristic overvaluations can be framed in rational terms and made plausible by the 
mere fact of being presented in accounting language. Intangibles can act as an instrument 
of collective fantasy and idealization. Decisions which may ultimately destroy value and 
jeopardize the survival, let alone the success, of the organization, escape challenge and 
well founded questioning. However, the financial statements of Enron do also contain 
shadows of the future which did materialise, although it is better hidden. Enron’s 2002 
annual report was the last one Enron would produce and is pervaded with a mood of 
breathtaking optimism about the future. Given Enron’s obsession with the future, it is not 
surprising that the document frames its performance in the form of what are known as 
‘Forward Looking Statements’. Despite the optimism of the document, is possible to find 
traces of the shadow of the future on page 29 in a section entitled ‘Information Regarding 
Forward-Looking Statements’, although the following 252 word sentence is rather less 
accessible than some of the more positive messages: 
 
“Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the 
forward-looking statements herein include success in marketing natural gas and power to 
wholesale customers; the ability of Enron to penetrate new retail natural gas and 
electricity markets (including energy outsourcing markets) in the United States and 
foreign jurisdictions; development of Enron’s broadband network and customer demand 
for intermediation and content services; the timing, extent and market effects of 
deregulation of energy markets in the United States, including the current energy market 
conditions in California, and in foreign jurisdictions; other regulatory developments in 
the United States and in foreign countries, including tax legislation and regulations; 
political developments in foreign countries; the extent of efforts by governments to 
privatize natural gas and electric utilities and other industries; the timing and extent of 
changes in commodity prices for crude oil, natural gas, electricity, foreign currency and 
interest rates; the extent of success in acquiring oil and gas properties and in discovering, 
developing, producing and marketing reserves; the timing and success of Enron’s efforts 
to develop international power, pipeline and other infrastructure projects; the 
effectiveness of Enron’s risk management activities; the ability of counterparties to 
financial risk management instruments and other contracts with Enron to meet their 
financial commitments to Enron; and Enron’s ability to access the capital markets and 
equity markets during the periods covered by the forward-looking statements, which will 
depend on general market conditions and Enron’s ability to maintain the credit ratings for 
its unsecured senior long-term debt obligations.” 
 
Some theorists have suggested that the symbolic representations which form the basis of 
accounting have now evolved into a simulacrum, or self-referential hyperreality 
(Macintosh, Shearer, Thornton and Welker, 2000). When considering the area of 
intangible value, this is a persuasive argument, as it is difficult to accurately locate 
intangible assets in a reality which is external to the accounting representations 
themselves. However, such denial and detachment from reality is dangerous, especially 
when it is associated with the legitimacy which accounting language affords. The 
underlying complexity and unpredictability of the world remains. The management of 
risk and complexity on a symbolic level may provide a welcome respite from the 
psychological challenges presented by a chaotic world but in reality it cannot keep the 
unravelling chaos of the future at bay. Accounting for intangibles can be seen as a means 
of perpetuating the myth of management control (Gabriel, 1998). As long as 
organizations select simplistic representations as a means of making sense then they will 
remain rooted in the false certainty and security of the past and consequently be 
unprepared for the surprises which the shadow of the future presents. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The growing emphasis on intangibles can be understood as a survival strategy – a means 
of ensuring the continued dominance of accounting representations under the looming 
shadow of an uncertain future. This paper has not sought to suggest that the use of 
accounting representations is invalid. Rather, it has aimed to illustrate that it is equally 
valid to consider the psychodynamic needs which accounting representations may serve. 
Until the processes described above are recognised there is little prospect of adequately 
appreciating the gap between the past and the future. If businesses fail to take a broader 
view then the future will be a repetition of the past but on a more and more catastrophic 
scale. The growing value accounted for in the form of intangibles can be seen to 
represent the shadow of the future but in a cryptic form.  
 
As Bion suggests (1979, p128) “In those situations in which the disguise – the 
conventional costume – excites psychiatric attention, they are liable to be described as 
participating in a folie-a-deux.  If they excite the attention of the Board of Trade they 
may become known as a famous business venture, although the dividing line – caesura? 
– between that and a bankruptcy, or criminal association …. may not be so easy to 
determine.” 
 
Uncertainty about the future cannot be contained in a balance sheet and the illusion of 
certainty provided by accounting frameworks puts stakeholders in an increasingly 
precarious position. The response to accounting scandals and business collapses 
continues to centre on more regulation and increased requirements for accounting 
disclosure. If our thesis is correct, then these mechanical measures will simply 
perpetuate the illusion of control, while denying the inevitability of the underpinning 
psychological reality.  A more realistic response would go further to acknowledge the 
shadow of the future and recognize that individuals and groups are intangible liabilities 
as much as assets.  
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